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CHALLENGES TO JURY COMPOSITION
IN
NORTH CAROLINA
MARK MICHAEL*
COURTNEY MULLIN**
JAMES O'REILLY***

JAMES V. ROWAN****

INTRODUCTION

The law applicable to challenges for discrimination in the selection of
a jury (grand or petit) has frequently been reviewed.' The starting point
for any analysis is the basic principle that a jury must fairly represent a
cross section of the community.
There is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents a cross section of the community. And a cross section of the
community includes persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with varying economic and social positions. Under our
Constitution, the jury is not to be made the representative of the most
intelligent, the most wealthy, or the most successful, nor of the least
intelligent, the least wealthy, or the least successful. It is a demo2
cratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of people.
Given this tenet, the practical question in jury challenge cases involves
the quantum and nature of the proof required to show discrimination in
the selection process.
Generally, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
* MARK MICHAEL is an attorney practicing law in Charlotte, North Carolina
and was associated as a volunteer on the Joan Little Defense Team.
** COURTNEY MULLIN is a Ph.D. candidate at North Carolina State University
and was the Director of the Joan Little Jury Project.
* ** JAMES O'REILLY is a graduate student in sociology at Duke University.
His
work was supported in part by the Program in Demography and Ecology, Duke University, operating under grant 5TO1GM01291 from the NIGMS of the National Institute
of Health; and by a grant from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
He gratefully acknowledges the vital assistance of Prof. Richard T. Campbell of Duke
University.
• *** JAMES V. ROWAN is an attorney practicing law in Durham, North Carolina
and was co-counsel for Joan Little. Much of the groundwork for this article was done
in preparation of the trial of State v. loan Little and involved many numbers of the
defense team too numerous to mention.
1. E.g., Kairys, Juror Selection, The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analysis, and A Case Study, 10 AMER. CRM. L. REV. 771 (1972); Comment, Grand Jury
Selection: Voter Registration Lists as a Cross-Section of the Community, 52 ORE. L.
REv. 482 (1973).
2. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947) (Murphy, Black, Douglas and
Rutledge, dissenting).
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established four alternate methods of showing discrimination.' First, the
sources of names of prospective jurors may be discriminating as to
certain identifiable and legally cognizable classes of people. For example, if names are taken from tax lists or voter registration lists which are
maintained separately for blacks and whites, a prima facie case of
discrimination is shown.' Second, if the process of selection itself is
discriminatory, a constitutional challenge will succeed.' Third, if the
results of the process reveal a significant disparity between the proportion of the challenged class and the community cross section, these
results may tend to establish discrimination. 6 This method, however,
must be qualified in light of the decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,' in
which the Court refused to find discrimination solely on the basis of
statistical imbalance, but did find discrimination by means of an examination of both the process and the results." There would thus seem to be
some doubt as to whether a numerical disparity by itself is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. 9 Finally, a successful challenge can be
based upon violation of the specific and statutory provisions governing
selection of the venire.
The fact that race is not the only cognizable classification is made
clear by Taylor v. Louisiana,'0 which struck down a Louisiana statute
which automatically excluded women from jury service unless they filed
a written notice of their desire to serve. The effect of the statute was
virtually total exclusion of women from juries; the case reversed an
earlier decision," and, as the court recognized, was the first square
holding that exclusion of women from jury panels in a criminal trial
denies a defendant's sixth amendment right to trial by a representative
cross section of the community. However, an attempt to identify a
specific age group as cognizable is far less likely to succeed."2
3. This analysis is taken from Kairys, supra n.1, at 596-597.
4. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1966).
5. E.g., Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1965); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559 (1963).

6. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
7. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
8. Id. at 630.

9. In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), the Court noted that a significant
under-representation had been shown, and added,

we cannot say that the under-representation reflected in these figures is so
insubstantial as to warrant no corrective action by a federal court. . . . p. 359.
[However, the Court also based its decision on the opportunity to discriminate in
the process used]. They [appellant-plaintiffs] further demonstrated that the disparity originated at least in part, at the one point in the selection process where the

jury commissioners invoked their subjective judgment rather than objective criteria. id.
10. 43 U.S.L.W. 4167 (Jan. 21, 1975).

11. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (rational basis for such exemption).
12. See Hamling v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974), in which Justice Rehn-
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Against this backgound, an examination of cases involving challenges
to jury composition in the Fourth Circuit is instructive as to the quantum of the proof necessary to establish discrimination. These cases
illustrate the factual showing which the above principles require.
THE LAW IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

There are three particularly important Fourth Circuit cases dealing
with attacks upon the racial composition of grand and petit juries, all
originating in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
The first is Hariston v. Cox." The defendant was convicted of first
degree murder in 1942, and brought a habeas corpus action in 1969 on
the grounds of systematic exclusion of blacks from the grand and petit
juries. The District Court held that no prima facie case had been
shown. 14 The Fourth Circuit reversed. The evidence showed: (1) 20%
of the population of the county from which the grand and petit juries
were drawn was black;1 5 (2) no blacks were on petitioner's grand or
petit jury;' 6 and (3) that voting lists containing racial designations were
the source of names used. 7
The Fourth Circuit held that the 0/20% disparity and the use of
racially designated lists constitued a prima facie case of systematic
exclusion, that particular acts of discrimination need not be shown, and
that the use of racially designated lists was an opportunity to discriminate.' 8 On remand, the state was given an opportunity to rebut the
prima facie case made out by petitioner, but the District Court Judge
found that the evidence presented showed, at best, that a black might
have occasionally slipped in. This was not enough: "That such token
inclusion will be condemned as readily as total exclusion is well established,"' 9 and the writ was granted.
The second case is Fuller v. Cox."0 The petitioner was convicted of
robbery in 1966 and sentenced to 28 years. 2 ' A habeas action was filed
alleging, among other grounds, that blacks had been systematically
quist, although not so holding, strongly indicated that "young people" (those 18-24) are
not an "identifiable group."
13. 311 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Va. 1969), rev'd and remanded, 459 F.2d 1382 (4th

Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1972), on remand, 361 F. Supp. 1180 (1973).
14.
15.
16.
17.

311 F. Supp. at1086.
459 F.2d at 1383.
Id.
Id.

18. Id. at 1384-85.
19. 361 F. Supp. at 1183. The court cited Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950)
and Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443 (1953).
20. 315 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Va. 1970), rev'd in an unreported decision, on remand,
356 F. Supp. 1185.
21. 315 F. Supp. at 868.
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excluded from the grand and petit juries. The petition was dismissed
and relief denied on all grounds. 22 The Fourth Circuit reversed in an
unreported decision. The grounds for reversal, however, are fairly clear
from the decision on remand. The evidence of discrimination was (1) a
black population of 25%, (2) in the period from 1960 to 1966, 39
grand juries, of seven members each, were convened, (3) 33 of these
had only one black, (4) the other six were "similar", and (5) the Clerk
of Court was shown to be able to identify racially the members of the
grand juries.2 3 The Court of Appeals held that "opportunity for systematic exclusion and results consistent with systematic exclusion"2 4 made
out a prima facie case.
On remand, the state argued in rebuttal that some blacks had in fact
'25
served, but, as in Hariston, this was dismissed as "token inclusion.
The state then argued good faith-that is, that blacks had not purposely
been excluded-but this was held insufficient to overcome the statistical
showing of an unconstitutional result,2a and the conviction was reversed.2 7 The case is particularly interesting by virtue of the manner in
which the opportunity to discriminate was shown-by having the clerk
of court identify members of the various grand juries by race. Thus,
even if a juror selection system appears facially neutral, a challenge to
the composition of the jury may be successful if those responsible for
picking jury members can be shown to know potential jurors well
enough to identify them racially.
The third case is Carringtonv. Slayton. 2s This was yet another habeas
action, this time from rape and abduction convictions.2 9 The District
Court applied the standards of the Court of Appeals on its own in this
case, and stated the test for a prima facie case as a substantial numerical
disparity, coupled with either additional positive indicia of discrimination or a showing that the selection process provided an opportunity for
discrimination.3" The court added that a presumption of discrimination
in fact where an opprotunity is shown, is not only permissible but
required. "From the cases, it seems that the question of whether there is
an opportunity to discriminate must be asked initially, assuming that, if
22. Id. at 870.
23. 356 F. Supp. at 1186.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1188.

26. Id. at 1189. The district court relied on Norths v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) for the proposition that "mere generalities" that "blacks had not purposely been
excluded and that race and color had not been considered" were insufficient to rebut
the prima facie case.

27. Id. at 1192.
28. 359 F. Supp. 189 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd. per curiam, 493 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir.
1974).
29. 359 F. Supp. at 190.
30. Id.
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possible, the public officials in the locality in question are going to
discriminate." 3'
The evidence in the case was: (1) that there were five jury commissioners, one of whom was black, (2) the population was 24.8% black,
(3) the master grand jury list was 11.55% black and (4) the particular
venire from which petitioner's petit juries were selected were 10% and
5% black for the first and second trials, respectively.32 Thus, a 2/1
disparity between the population and the jury list was shown. However,
further evidence revealed not only that the grand jury which indicted
petitioner was 33% black,3 3 but also that those blacks who were stricken from the list were normally stricken by the black jury commissioner.3 4 For these reasons, the court concluded that if an opportunity to
discriminate existed, it had not been exercised, and denied relief. The
3 5
Fourth Circuit affirmed per curiam.
Other decisions in the Fourth Circuit are consistent with these. In one
case, the Court of Appeals held that where a petitioner was only able to
show a 2/1 disparity and a possible opportunity to discriminate, he was
at least entitled to a -hearing at which both he and the state would
produce more evidence. 3 Despite the fact that there was no other
evidence of racial discrimination, the court seemed to feel that the
imbalance and opportunity to discriminate were sufficient to make out a
prima facie case unless valid reasons for the imbalance were presented at
the hearing.
In one case in which a 2/1 disparity was shown, the fact that the trial
judge himself picked the grand jurors was held to be an opportunity to
discriminate, and a prima facie case was made out. 7 And, in a fairly
typical case in which the quantum of evidence was held sufficient to
show discriminatory jury selection, a population of 45.5% blacks in
which jurors were picked from tax lists maintained separately for whites
and "colored", with a resulting jury list 4.5%, was sufficient to make out
a prima facie case."8
The Court of Appeals indicated its position with respect to age and
31. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 191-92.
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 181.
35. 493 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1974).
36. Stephens v. Cox, 315 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Va. 1970), 449 F.2d 657 (4th Cir.
1971). This decision was heavily relied on by the district court in Carrington v. Slayton, supra n.28.
37. Wansley v. Miller, 353 F. Supp. 42, 43 (E.D. Va. 1973).
38. Parker v. Ross, 330 F. Supp. 13, 14 (E.D.N.C. 1971). The decision was reversed, not because the court of appeals disagreed that a prima facie case was shown,
but on the ground that an intelligent guillty plea was a waiver of any defects in the grand
and petit juries, 470 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1972).
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sex and grounds for attacking jury composition in a 1968 case.8 9 The
court stated first: "As to age as a measure of representation, we do not
believe that members of arbitrarily drawn age brackets necessarily constitute valid categories for measuring the legality of jury selection." 40
This position seems inconsistant with the majority view.4 ' With respect
to women, the court states that "substantial representation" is sufficient.42 Whether this position will change as a result of Taylor v.
Louisiana,supra, is unclear. On the one hand, Taylor was a case of total
exclusion. On the other, Taylor explicitly affirmed that a fair cross
section of the community is constitutionally required. Whether this
standard is met by "substantial representation" or whether the proper
test is that applied in race cases (significant underrepresentation) has
yet to be decided. A strong case can be made that a fair cross section
requires more than substantial representation and that any signficant
underrepresentation of women is unconstitutional.
In sum, the federal cases in the Fourth Circuit require the following
elements for a successful challenge to the composition of grand or petit
juries on the grounds of discrimination in their selection:
1. A signficiant numerical disparity between the percentage of a
cognizable group-definitely blacks, probably women, probably not a
specific age group---in the population as a whole and the percentage
appearing on the grand or petit jury. The cases seem to require a
disparity of about 2 to 1, and
2. Proof of actual discrimination, or
3. A showing that the selection procedure provides an opportunity for
discrimination. This opportunity may arise in various ways, including
the use of lists with racial designations, or by a showing that the jury
commissioners knew the race of the people selected. Allegations of good
faith on the part of the commissioners is insufficient to rebut a prima
facie case.
If these requirements are met, then a prima facie case of discrimination is made out. The burden then shifts to the state to justify the
disparity for valid, non-discriminatory reasons, or to show that no
discrimination was in fact practiced.
THE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA

The North Carolina courts have been reluctant to approve challenges
to the composition of grand or petit juries. It appears that in only one
instance has such a challenge been upheld and that decision was re39.
40.
41.
42.

United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 391.
See, Hamling v. United States, supra n.12, and cases cited therein.
United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d at 390.
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versed in the North Carolina Supreme Court. 43 The standard to be
applied to such challenges has been held by the Court of Appeals to
require proof of intentional discrimination: "To constitute unlawful
discrimination, defendant must establish that the mode of jury selection
is arbitrarily, systematically and intentionally discriminatory."4 4 (emphasis added) It appears that the Court of Appeals was overstating the
requirement; the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court on
which it relied requires "intentional, arbitrary or systematic discrimination" (emphasis added) to establish a prima facie case. 4 5
If the Court of Appeals meant to require proof of intentional discrimination, however, it appears that such an analysis cannot stand review.
In a case reviewing New Jersey's "key man" 46 system of choosing juries,
the state contended, like the Court of Appeals, that a showing of
deliberate discrimination was necessary.4 7 This view was given short
shrift in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals----". . . there is no support
for that review." 4' 8 The standard enunciated by the state supreme
court-"intentional, arbitrary or systematic discrimination"-would
therefore appear to be the law in North Carolina, although the matter is
not free from doubt.
Even if intentional discrimination is not required, however, the cases
show extreme difficulty in bringing successful jury challenges in North
Carolina. For example, in State v. Cornell,4 9 the supreme court quashed
the indictment against the defendants on the basis of evidence showing
that approximately 20% of the population of the community as a whole
was black, but that only about 10% of those called for jury duty were
black.5 0 The supreme court reversed, principally on the ground the
purposeful discrimination is not shown merely by numerical underrepresentation.51
The Cornell decision is anomalous in two respects. First, the court
recognized as "well-established" the proposition that the mere denial by
officials responsible for preparing jury lists where discrimination was
practiced will not overcome a prima facie case. 52 The defendants intro43. State v. Cornell, 281 N.C. 20, 187 S.E.2d 768 (1972).
44. State v. Tant, 16 N.C. App. 113, 116, 191 S.E.2d 387 (1972) (emphasis added).

45. State v. Cornell, supra note 43 (emphasis added).
46. In a "key man" system, the jury commissioners located strategically placed
members of the community--"key men"-to suggest prospective jurors.
47. Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 281.
49. Supra note 43.

50. Id. at 27.
51. Id. at 33-34. The court relied on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964).
52. Id. at 31. The court cited State v. Wilson, 262 N.C. 419, 137 S.E.2d 109
(1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 ,U.S. 475 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); and Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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duced testimony of all the members of the jury commission that no
discrimination had been practiced.58 Obviously, the purpose of this
testimony was to attack the credibility of the commissioners, since no
explanation whatsoever for the disparity was offered by the state. The
supreme court, however, held that, since the defendant had called all the
officials who might be able to explain the imbalance, the state was
relieved of the exclusion occurred: "By offering this testimony defendants exhausted the state's sources of information and affirmatively
showed that the officials assidously complied with the provisions of
Article I, Chapter 9 of the General Statutes."5 4
Certainly the officials testified that they performed their duties impartially, but if they had done so, some non-racial explanation of the
exclusion of large numbers of blacks would have been forthcoming. The
argument of the supreme court here seems to be as follows: A numerical
imbalance has been shown. If it were the result of discrimination, these
officials would know it. But since these officials testified they did not
discriminate, then, despite the fact that no other explanation has been
offered, no discrimination occurred. The denial by the officials, however, is obviously amenable to more than one interpretation.
Second, and directly contrary to Fullerv. Cox, 55 the court rejected the
evidence that the commissioners knew the race of some of the prospective jurors as showing an opportunity to discriminate. "We note in
passing that a person who would qualify to serve on a jury commission
would of necessity possess this knowledge of his county in order to
impose the objective statutory criteria in preparing the jury list."5 6 The
statement is, of course, correct but it in no way deals with the problem
that such knowledge on the part of the commissioners is an opportunity
to discriminate, whether exercised or not. The court seems to argue that
proof of opportunity to discriminate requires proof of actual discrimination.
Defendants' evidence further shows that there was no such 'opportunity for discrimination' in the selection of the Forsyth County jury
list as was found in Whitus and that the individual jury commissioners
did not remove any name from the 5raw
jury list solely on the basis of
7
suspected race or the named person.
In Whitus,58 the jury list was taken from tax records which distinguished blacks from whites.5 9 There was no testimony that individuals
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 35.
Id.
Supra note 21-27.
Supra note 43, at 35.
Id.
Whims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
Id. at 549.
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were removed from the jury list because of their race; indeed, all three
commissioners denied that anyone was included or excluded because of
his or her race.6" The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction because "the opportunity for discrimination was present and we
cannot say on this record that it was not resorted to by the commissioners." 61 It is difficult to see how the North Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that no comparable opportunity for discrimination existed
and was resorted to where the evidence showed that the commissioners
knew the race of some prospective jurors, blacks were significantly
underrepresented, and the only explanations offered were conclusory
denials by the jury commissioners of any wrongdoing.
With this judicial hostility toward challenges to jury selection methods, it is hardly surprising that Cornell is unique in that a successful
challenge was made. Thus, in a case involving age discrimination, a flat
statement from the sheriff that no 18-21 year olds were included in the
jury panel was dismissed as a "casual expression."62 And, in a case in
which the jury list was prepared from voter registration lists with "W"
no discriminaand "C" designating racial classifications, the court held
63
tion was shown, and defended the racial classifications.
In North Carolina, then, the standard may not be as stringent as that
of intentional discrimination, as held by the Court of Appeals. But it is
clear that a mere showing of a numerical disparity and an opportunity to
discriminate will not suffice. What is required is proof of "systematic"
discrimination. What quantum of proof is required for such a showing is
unclear, since jury challenges have been uniformly unsuccessful. It is
clear, however, that evidence which would be sufficient proof of discrimination in the selection of grand and petit juries in federal courts is
not enough. As a practical matter, then, the Court of Appeals may have
accurately stated the North Carolina standard.
Considering the difficulties which will confront compositional challenges in North Carolina, it is essential that those who would seek to
raise the question of under-representation be well grounded in both the
theoretical and practical problems to be faced. The remainder of this
article will address itself to some methodological considerations and to
some specific findings which have already been discovered.
THE METHODOLOGY

OF A

COMPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE

In North Carolina, the procedures for selecting a jury pool which
would result in a pool that theoretically assures defendants of represent60. Id.
61. ld. at 552.
62. State v. Barnwell, 17 N.C. App. 299, 194 S.E.2d 63 (1973).
63. State v. Carroll, 282 N.C. 326, 193 S.E.2d 85 (1972).
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ative juries are set forth in N.C. General Statutes §§9-1 et seq. A threemember jury commission is appointed for a two-year term by: 1. the
senior regular resident superior court judge; 2. the clerk of superior
court; and 3. the board of county commissioners. The jury commissioners are required to be qualified voters of the county." The jury commission is charged with: 1. the preparation of a jury pool list; and 2. the
delivery of the list to the Register of Deeds at least 30 days prior to
January 1 in odd-numbered years. 6 5 Such a list must be adequate to
supply jurors for a period of two years. The names of prospective jurors
are to be systematically drawn from both property tax lists and voter
registration lists and may, in addition, be drawn from a third source
such as a telephone book. The list must contain not less than 1 1/4
times and not more than three times as many names as were drawn for
jury duty in all courts in the county during the previous biennium.6 6 The
actual number of names for the pool must never be less than 500 names.
Persons eligible for jury duty are required to be citizens of North
Carolina and residents of the county from which they are to be drawn.
Those individuals who served during the previous biennium are exempt
from service, as are those who are less than 18 years of age. Jurors must
be physically and mentally competent and must not have been convicted
of a felony. 67 All others are eligible to serve as jurors.
The jury pool list is placed upon separate cards which give the name
of the juror and give his or her permanent address. These cards are
placed in alphabetical order, given a permanent number, and filed
numerically. Such cards are retained by the Register of Deeds and are
8
available for public inspection during normal office hours .
In order to be excused from jury duty, individuals must show compelling personal hardship or that their service may be deemed to be
contrary to the public welfare, health, or safety. Such excuses are to be
given by the chief district judge or any district judge designated by the
chief district judge. Discretionary authority of a presiding judge to
excuse persons at the beginning or during a court session is also allowed.
When such excuses are granted, the clerk of court must notify the
Register of Deeds who in turn notes the excuse on the juror's card and
then files that card separately. The cards of those persons who are called
on jury duty are withdrawn from the file and filed separately with the
date of service inscribed upon the card. 9
64. N.C.
65. N.C.
66. N.C.
67. N.C.
68. N.C.

GEN.
GEN.
GEN.
GEN.
GEN.
69. N.C. GEN.

STAT.,

STAT.,
STAT.,
STAT.,
STAT.,
STAT.,

§
§
§
§
§

9-1.
9-2.
9-2.
9-3.
9-4.

§ 9-6.
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Thus, on its face, the statute appears to be non-discriminatory. In
fact, it severely limits the categories of non-service but the result of
the vague wording allows for considerable discrimination against such
groups as blacks, women, young, and old to occur in fact. The major
charge against the statute is its lack of delineation of an affirmative
responsibility on the part of the jury commissioners particularly, and
the judges to a lesser extent, to obtain a jury pool which represents an
adequate cross section of the community from which it was drawn. At
a minimum the population characteristics of the jury pool should be
compared with the census data as a routine matter by the jury commission.
Secondly, the primary use of property tax rolls and voter registration
lists discriminates immediately against cognizable groups, most particularly poor people, and in this state poor is synonymous with blacks.
Many other lists exist which would be readily available to provide a
more adequate representation of all of the people. Welfare lists, social
security lists, and high-school student lists are among the kinds of lists
that could be used. Telephone books normally exclude the very people
who are also excluded in property tax and voter lists and therefore they
do not offer any remedy to the problem.
The exclusion of particular groups by the jury commission represents
a major source of jury discrimination. When embarking upon a compositional challenge, it is important to investigate as thoroughly as possible
all levels of the jury selection process. The first step in this procedure is
to obtain the jury commissioners report, filed with the Register of Deeds
office. In this report the method of systematic selection used and the
source lists used should be indicated. Thus a determination can then be
made as to whether the requirements of the statute have been followed,
i.e., the use of proper lists and a true random selection of every n'th
name plus the use of all books or a random selection of these books. All
lists should be examined for any indication of the race of the individual.
The actual or "raw" list should be obtained from the jury commission,
as well as a list of those who were stricken or culled from the raw list. It
is possible then to make an actual comparison of the names on the raw
list with those on the source list to determine whether or not the
selection was carried out properly. The examination of the list of those
who were culled may result in the determination of any patterns of
discrimination, such as against blacks, women, women with small children, persons over a given age limit, professional persons, persons who
reside in particular areas, such as in housing projects or other poor
sections of the town. Finally there should be a comparison of the list
retained by the Register of Deeds and the raw list to determine that all
persons appear on both lists, i.e., that more persons were not culled than
those appearing on the culled list.
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1975
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At this point, a survey may be undertaken to determine the exact
population characteristics of both the raw unculled list and the jury pool
itself. This may be accomplished by means of a random selection of
these lists of 100 persons. The age, race, and sex of these individuals
should then be determined. Population characteristics may be obtained
from census data for each county. A comparison can then be made by
means of a Chi-Square statistical test to determine whether or not the
differences detected in the jury pool population and the population of
the county are occurring by chance alone or whether such differences
could not occur by chance alone and must be the result of systematic
discrimination. A cook book description of the use of the Chi-Square
test need not be as frightening as it might appear at first blush.
The Chi-Square formula should be used wherever the characteristic
being examined is definable by more than two categories, as in this
example where you are comparing the number of people selected from
various regional divisions within a community.
The formula is:

where, for the example of a geographical disparity,
N - the total population;
N, = the number of people living in each of i geographical divisions
(for example, using voting wards, N 1 is the number living in
ward 1, N2 is the number living in ward 2, etc.);
n = the number of persons in the sample or pool; and
X - the number of persons in the sample or pool who live in each
of the geographical divisions.

[-n
The value

(Ni)2
fN*'

is computed for each geographic

division, and the sum of these results is converted into a probability
value with the use of another standard table.
This equation is also understandable in a more common sense way.
n(I

is the expected number of persons that should come from

each geographical division. Thus, if 500,000 people out of a total of
1,000,000 came from division 1, we would expect a sample of 200
jurors to contain 100 from division 1, or
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N1 - 500,000
N - 1,000,000
n - 200, and

n (-I-) = 100.
70
The numerator is the disparity.
Some discussion should occur at this point in defense of the use of the
sample size of 100 and the testing of the two populations by means of
the Chi-Square test. Such a small sample size appears immediately to be
suspect as to its validity. However, if a random selection of the populations, i.e., jury pool, is conducted, then differences of at least 10
percentage points can be detected by a sample of 100. Federal courts
have held that 10 percentage points discrepancy between the pool and
the population may be considered discriminatory to the point that new
jury pools must be constituted. However, it should be pointed out that
10 percent is probably the bare minimum, and the greater the difference
that can be detected, the more probable the chances for a successful
challenge to the composition of the pool. 71 Thus, it is apparent that the
courts are interested only in rectifying the gross discrepancies between
the pool and the general population. In this regard, the use of the ChiSquare test is highly recommended, as it is designed in such a manner as
to ensure that only large discrepancies will be detected by this test.
Chi-Square tests are extremely sensitive to the sample size; when they
are used with a sample size of 100 the test can be expected to point up
only the grossest differences. Thus when the sample size is increased to
say 1000, the probability of finding significant differences between the
two measured populations is heightened. When differences between the
two populations are detected with a large sample size, it is not possible
to determine whether gross differences or small differences exist. This
problem is alleviated by using the 100 sample size wherein only gross
differences are detected.
In the past the courts have been satisfied to hear the percentage
difference between the jury pool population and the general population.
This method is erroneous and should be discarded immediately in favor
of a sampling method and comparison of the two by a Chi-Square test.
The problem with seeking to find absolute percentage differences is that
it is absolutely impossible to determine the percentage of WHAT. We

70. THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE (D. KAIRYS ed.
1975).
71. D. Kairys, Jury Selection:" The Law, A Mathematical Method and a Case
Study, 10 AMER. Cium. L. REv. 771 (1972); R. Copeland, Introduction to Challenging
Jury Composition,Guild Notes, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1974).
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have no adequate measures to absolutely determine such differences.
Statistical theory is based upon the premise that a random sample
reflects the population from which it is drawn and that it is possible to
generalize from this sample to the population from which it is drawn.
It may seem incredible to you at first that, regardless of the shape of
the population being sampled, the means of 'sufficiently large' samples will have a normal distribution, i.e., bell-shaped curve. Such is
the case, however. This is one of the reasons why the normal distribution is so important in statistics. Just how large the n, or sample
size, must be before the sampling distribution of X, the mean, is
nearly normal depends on the shape of the population. Samples of
size 100 are probably large enough to yield nearly normal sampling
distributions of X for most populations one might meet in prac72
tice.
Therefore it is possible to compare the sample with another measure, in
this case with the census data, to determine whether the sample from
the jury pool reflects the overall population of the county. When this has
been accomplished, it is possible to attach a probability level of such a
difference as the one detected by the test occurring simply by chance
alone. The point set by scientists as the minimum level at which there is
confidence that differences do exist, is five chances out of one hundred,
(P. = .05), or that such a difference as the one detected could occur
only in five chances out of 100, and 95 times out of 100 you are
measuring actual differences. Differences found at the .05 level of
probability can generally be considered to be actual differences between
the two measured populations. Thus in this case the fact that such
differences occur is correct 95% of the time. Statisticians recommend
the drawing of a sample in preference to an actual counting as a
superior and more accurate met-hod of determining differences between
two populations.
The term population takes on genuine meaning when coupled with
the definition of a sample of a population. A sample is a part, or
subset, of a population. The sample is generally selected in a deliberate fashion from the population in order that the properties of the
population can be studied. . . . A random sample
. . . is ran78
domly representative of the population in all respects.
In Chi-Square test with a sample of 100, a difference which is found to
occur by chance alone only five times out of 100 may be considered
extremely reliable information that indeed gross differences do in fact
72. GLASS
p.245 (1970).

A"

STANLEY,

SrATISTIcAL

METHODS

IN EDUCATION

AND PSYCHOLOGY,

73. Op. Cit. at 240.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-5.
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exist between the jury pool and the population in general. Were you to
draw an even larger sample, it is probable that the chances of such
differences occurring would drop to extremely low levels such as 6
ohances in 10,000,000, which may impress the court but does not
necessarily meet the requirement of the court that there be gross differences between the pool and the population.
It is possible by this method to determine whether or not the source
lists adequately represent the population of the county and whether or
not the sample drawn by the jury commission from these source lists also
adequately represents the population of the county. Differences between
the population characteristics of the jury pool and the source lists
indicates, de facto, the discriminatory process used by the commissioners
in the culling of the lists. Thus it is possible that an adequate number of
women may be on the source lists, but the culling process of the
commissioners may result in detectable under-representation of women
in the jury pool.
The next step in the selection process is the random selection of jurors
to meet the court needs during particular sessions of court. The most
common method of selecting such jurors is to draw numbered disks
74
from a vat which contains a disk for each individual in the jury pool.
The numbers on the disks correspond with the numbers affixed to the
cards which are filed with the Register of Deeds. Thus the drawing
occurs without the knowledge of the names of the particular persons
who are being drawn. The numbers are transferred to the Register of
Deeds office which attaches the names of the persons whose cards have
the same numbers as those drawn. A list is made indicating the names
and addresses of those who are to be served summons to appear for jury
duty by the sheriff's office. Having received this list, the sheriff's office
normally either mails out the summons to the prospective jurors or hand
delivers such summons. Individuals who wish to be excused from jury
service are directed to present their excuses to the presiding district
judge.7 5 Those who are not excused are directed to appear in court on a
given day for their jury duty. At such time as the jurors arrive at the
courtroom, the judge may excuse them at his discretion.
It is at this stage further opportunity for biasing of the pool of jurors
who are actually available to sit occurs. First, the summons mailed out
by the sheriff's office may not reach particular groups of people. For
example, the in and out migration of blacks and/or poor may be such
that many of them are not reachable by a mailing system. Objections by
challenges to the array may be based on partiality, misconduct of the
75. N.C.

GEN. STAT.,

§ 9-6.
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sheriff, or irregularity in making our jury lists. 78 Finally, there is a
possible source of bias in the excuses allowed by the judge. In particular,
judges tend to excuse young mothers on the basis of extreme hardship.
It is possible to obtain both the summons lists and the list of those
who actually were eligible to sit as jurors from the clerk of court's office.
By taking a random sample of both of these lists and by making a
comparison of the population oharacteristics of the individuals appearing on the summons list, with and without those excused or not found
by the sheriff, and the list of those individuals who actually were present
to serve for jury duty, it is possible to determine the discrepancies
between these people and the characteristics of the general population
and to attach a probability level to this difference so as to obtain a
reliability measure of whether this difference occurred as a result of
chance or whether it occurred as a result of systematic discrimination.
Thus it is possible to indicate the bias appearing at particular levels of
the selection process and to finally indicate the differences of the total
selection procedure by a comparison of the population characteristics of
those who actually were eligible to serve on juries and the population
characteristics of the county from which they were drawn. Of course
requirements of time and money, or perhaps the availability of the
required records may cause a comparison to be made at only one level of
the selection procedure rather than at all levels.
Customarily in compositional challenges, evidence concerning the
numerical percentage of under-representation of certain cognizable
groups has been presented to the court. Though this may meet the
traditional requirements of the court, the argument can be strengthened
by showing that the numerical differences are indicative of important
attitudinal differences. 77 The law requires that jury pools be consitituted
of a fairly representative cross section of the community from which
they are drawn. Thus the law implicitly recognized that cognizable
groups of people hold attitude and belief systems that are unique and
not entirely overlapping and that the accomplishment of justice depends
upon the representation of all such attitude and belief structures within
the jury pool itself. To have the attitudes of a single particular cognizable group appearing on juries thwarts the premise on which the concept
of justice rests. The legal system of jury selection procedures provides
for such overall representation in that names are randomly selected both
from source lists and for actual summonsing. Thus theoretically a
sample is derived from the overall population and such a sample should,
as was explained earlier, be adequately representative of the population
from which it is drawn.
76. State v. Shaw, 284 N.C. 366, 200 S.E.2d 585 (1973).
77. THE JuRy SYSTEM, supra note 70, at 31.
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Therefore, it is recommended that attitudinal measurements be taken
via a survey technique so as to provide data showing the attitudinal
differences that exist between cognizable groups, for example, males
and females, whites and blacks. Thus the argument becomes: not only
are these people numerically unrepresented on juries, but also, since
these groups hold attitudes that are in part unique to them, the infusion
of such attitudes upon judgmental process by juries of the guilt or
innocence of defendants is being denied, that defendants have the right
to be judged by a jury of their peers, meaning a representative cross section of their community and the accompanying attitude and belief structures held by this cross section of people.
A telephone survey of 100 randomly selected individuals is an entirely
appropriate approach. Care should be exercised to poll only people who
would be eligible for jury service under the statute; the questionnaire
used should contain commonly used personality measures as well as
measures of attitudes toward the issues surrounding your particular case.
The use of an experienced survey leader is highly recommended to
ensure that proper scientific controls are exercised to ensure validity and
reliability of results.
Such a person, normally a sociologist, could then testify during the
hearing of the motion challenging the composition of the pool. This
testimony includes a description of the methodology employed in the
survey, the results of the survey in detecting differences of attitude
between cognizable groups and discussion of the implications of these
results upon the verdicts rendered by juries. Such testimony should
include a discussion of the dynamics of group process. It is wise to offer
the judge an affidavit containing this information prior to the testimony
of the expert witness to facilitate his understanding and comprehension
of the material. This witness may also explain the statistical tests used if
qualified or a statistician may be employed.
Another expert witness who may be extremely helpful to the argument is a demographer. This individual not only presents the census
data into evidence but is also capable of interpreting this data to render
it more meaningful to the court. For example, undercount of blacks by
the census may be recitified to more accurately represent the true
population numbers of blacks. A demographer can also be used to make
inferences re the probable population characteristics of the source lists in
cases in which prior sampling from these lists is not feasible. The
exclusion of poor people from property tax lists becomes explicit
through census data on the ownership of automobiles, homes, and home
rentals. It is possible for the high correlation between minority group
status and the designation as being "poor" to be pointed out. The
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extensiveness of the testimony by a demographer depends entirely upon
thorough yet creative research on the part of both lawyer and demographer.
One final suggestion for presentation of evidence within the courtroom is the use of oharts depicting the testimony of the experts. These
charts should be quite large in size and should be easy to understand.
Bar graphs are most common but circle graphs or some other form may
be used instead. The cost of such charts is quite high, but well worth the
money when one considers the fact that the judge is being presented
with considerable amounts of unfamiliar information which must be
made absolutely clear to him within a relatively short space of time. Any
prop that can be used to clarify the argument should be used.
SOME SPECIFIC FINDINGS

OF UNREPRESENTATION

This section will report on a study of jury representation in six large
urban counties of North Carolina conducted in 1974-75. The purpose of
this section is to indicate the seriousness and wide-spread nature of the
problem of achieving a representative jury.
Six county jury systems were examined: Mecklenburg, Guilford,
Wake, Forsyth, Cumberland, and Durham. In the 1970 Census these six
contained 28 percent of the total state population and 30 percent of its
Black population. The key findings indicate that each county's jury pool
significantly underrepresents Blacks, the poor, and women-no matter
which of the two sources required by North Carolina law was used,
voting or county tax lists, or in what proportion.
A random sample ranging from 500 to 900 jurors drawn from each
county jury pool was obtained from the offices of the Clerks of Superior
Court. Then, from each address given on the jury list, the U. S. Bureau
of the Census tract in which that person lived was plotted using official
maps, Census geographic files, commercial directories, and postal information. The lowest rate of placing addresses was for Mecklenburg
County, where more than 95 percent of the 894 jurors were located by
tract. For the other five counties the placement rate exceeded by 97
percent. Addresses which were not found normally were either post
office boxes or nonexistent streets.
Next, the number of jurors each tract would be expected to have if the
jury pool contained a cross section of the county was computed. The
number of persons eligible for jury duty in each tract was taken to be the
tract's number of persons over 17 years old reported in the. 1970
Census.
Therefore, the expected number of jurors called or served equaled a
tract's proportion of the county's population of people over 17, multi-
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plied by the number of jurors called or served in the county sample. For
example, if Tract X had 10 percent of the over 17 population in the
county, and there were 700 jurors called in our sample, Tract X's
expected number of jurors called would be 70.
The tracts expected and observed numbers of jurors were then compared using a standard statistical technique, the Chi-Square test. The
Chi-Square test shows the mathematical probability of the distribution
of jurors by tract found in the sample occurring if the base population
(the full county jury pool) was a reasonable cross section of the adult
population.
Next, a percentage rate of jury representation for each tract was
computed by subtracting the expected number of jurors from the observed number and then dividing by the expected. Four separate rates
were created: persons called, those who actually served as a juror,
women called, and women served. Sex was determined by the first name
or honorific shown on the jury list; service was counted by using the
notation of the jury clerks on each list.
Jurors called covered all names drawn from the jury pool, including
those who served or were excused, or who court officials marked as not
found, moved, or deceased. Jurors served covered all persons who
recorded as having shown up for jury service at least one day during the
period; it does not necessarily mean the person sat on a trial jury. The
same definitions applied to the female population determined the females called and females served measures.
Each of the four rates was examined statistically by comparing it with
major social, economic, and demographic differences between the tracts
to see what factors were most strongly associated with over or underrepresentation.
All data not taken from official jury records came from either the
1970 Census of Population and Housing, Census Tracts, PHC (1),
publication, or from 1970 Census computer tapes.
The study found that in each of the six counties on each of the four
measures of jury representation it is highly unlikely that the jury pool is
a representative cross section of the communities they are drawn from.
Table 1 shows the Chi-Square value for each of the six counties of the
four jury representation categories plus the total number of Census
tracts per county. The Chi-Square values indicate the probability of the
observed sample of jurors by tract occuring if the full two-year jury
pools reflected a cross section of the eligible population shown by the
Census. Every one of the 24 values is statistically significant beyond the
.05 level. That is, there is less than one chance in twenty that any of the
jury pools or any of the categories is a cross section of the county.
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Table 1: Chi-Square Values for Jury Representation in Six North Carolina Counties.
DUR-

CUMBER-

GUIL-

FOR- MECKLEN-

HAM

LAND

FORD

SYTH

BURG

WAKE

Jurors Called
Jurors Served

147
107

118
151

168
111

122
93

185
110

222
104

Females Called
Females Served
Number of Tracts

107
72
34

81
73
36

217
128
77

180
110
58

249
140
74

257
127
54

All of the 24 probability levels are from less than 1-in 1000 to less than
1-in- 1,000,000.
Moreover, the fundamental test of a jury system's representativeness is the composition of the total group called for jury service. For this
category-jurors called-the study found for all six counties a less than
1-in-i,000,000 probability of the jury pool being made up of a cross
section of the population.
The second step of the study examined rates of jury representation for
the four categories and a variety of social, economic, and demographic
characteristics of the tracts. Among the factors looked at were the
percent black, income levels, housing values, rental levels, the occupational structure, education, and labor force characteristics. Some variables operated similarly in all counties, while others changed direction
from county to county. An example of the latter was the percentage of
the tract's labor force engaged in agriculture. In Cumberland County
this was associated with overrepresentation on the four jury rates, while
in Mecklenburg the proportion of the labor force in agriculture was
related to underrepresentation on all four rates.
Throughout, however, on all four jury measures for all counties,
variables related to race and social class behaved consistently: underrepresentation was associated with the tracts' percent of adult blacks, with
low levels of income and education, and with the proportion of the labor
force working in low-status jobs, such as household and service work.
Most often these associations were substantial and statistically significant.
Conversely, overrepresentation was consistently related to the tracts'
percent of adult whites, with higher income and education, and with
larger proportions of the labor force employed in higher-status jobs,
such as professional, technical, and managerial work. These associations
in general were also substantial and statistically significant.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss1/3

20

Michael et al.: Challenges to Jury Composition in North Carolina

CHALLENGES TO JURY COMPOSITION
Table 2: Rates of Jury Representation in Six North Carolina Counties
for Census Tracts with More Than 1000 Blacks over 17 years of age.

Jurors Called
Jurors Served

DUR-

CUMBER-

GUIL-

FOR-

MECKLEN-

HAM

LAND

FORD

SYTH

BURG

WAKE

-40%
-32%

-23%
-28%

-36%
-40%

-20%
-21%

-32%
-16%

-23%
-15%

Females Called

-53%

-61%

-69%

-55%

-62%

-66%

Females Served

-43%

-53%

-73%

-53%

-54%

-64%

All persons
18-+ Yrs.

22946

20564

33611

26408

51231

42809

12378
60%

27830
83%

24140
91%

38017
74%

20192
47%

52%
7

84%
11

82%
12

82%
19

66%
10

Blacks
18+ Yrs.
19720
Percent Black
86%
% of Total County
Adult Blacks
67%
Tracts
9

Tables 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the pattern of representation and suggest
its magnitude for the four jury rates. Table 2 shows the rates of
representation for all tracts in each county with more than 1000 18year-old blacks; Table 3 deals with the same information for all tracts
with less than 50 adult blacks; and Table 4 shows tracts which have
more than 30 percent of all families with income below the federal
poverty line.
As shown in Table 2, on every jury measure for every county these
groups of heavily black tracts are sharply underrepresented, ranging
from a low of -15 percent for jurors served in Wake to a high of -73
percent for females served in Cumberland. It should be noted that all
data for Cumberland has been computed with the Fort Bragg Census
tract and juror counts deleted to insure a conservative estimate of
representation.
The overall impact on blacks of the pattern of misrepresentation can
clearly be gauged by Table 2. Line eight indicates the percentage of the
total county black population that lives in the heavily black tracts
covered by the table. Thus, for Durham, more than two-thirds of that
county's eligible Blacks live in areas that are underrepresented by 40
percent in jurors called, 32 percent in jurors served, 53 percent in
females called, and 43 percent in females served.
More than half of Cumberland's adult blacks live in the tracts covered
the jury representation percentages of Table 3, two-thirds for Wake, and
more than four-fifths in Guilford, Forsyth, and Mecklenburg.
Largely the reverse representation pattern can be observed in Table 3,
the group of tracts with less than 50 adult blacks. In each county no
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more than one percent of the county's adult blacks and residents of
those areas, and each tract group is overrepresented in jurors called and
jurors served, ranging from + 14 percent for jurors called in Guilford to
+ 100 percent in jurors served in Cumberland. For the two female jury
categories the pattern is not as sharply the opposite of Table 2, with
some countys' heavily white tract groups underrepresented and other
overrepresented in women called and served. However, while in Guilford, Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Wake counties the groups of white
tracts show substantial underrepresentation, in each case the underrepresentation is less for the white tracts than the comparable heavily black
tracts in Table 2.
Table 3: Rates of Jury Representation in Six North Carolina Counties
for Census Tracts with Less Than 50 Blacks Over 17 Years of Age.
DURHAM

CUMBERLAND

GUILFORD

FORSYTH

MECKLENBURG

WAKE

Jurors Called
Jurors Served
Females Called

27%
25%
19%

15%
100%
-38%

14%
23%
-49%

15%
22%
-40%

21%
16%
-30%

39%
43%
-32%

Females Served

51%

25%

-38%

-43%

-34%

-35%

11239

1838

21030

55388

107268

39201

37

All Persons
18+ Yrs.
Blacks
18+ Yrs.

143

400

283

561

345

Percent Black
%of Total County

1%

2%

2%

1%

1%

1%

Adult Blacks
Tracts

1%
5

0%
1

1%
26

1%
23

1%
31

1%
18

Table 4 shows the jury representation rates for all tracts with greater
than 30 percent for the families with income below the federal poverty
line in 1970. A similar pattern to that of the heavily black tracts is
evident. Every county for every jury category shows underrepresentation. The minimum is -7 percent for persons served in Wake to -79
percent in females called in Guilford.
The broad overlap of these who are poor and those who are black is
also illustrated by Table 4. These tract groups are from 48 to 89 percent
black and contain from 22 to 35 percent of the total adult black
population of the counties. This high interrelationship of income and
race makes it difficult to assess which of the two factors is most
important in the various counties. However, it is clear both are important factors.
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Table 4: Rates of Jury Representation in Six North Carolina Counties
for Census Tracts with Greater Than 30 Percent of Families with
Income Below the Poverty Level.
DUR-

CUMBER-

GUIL-

FOR-

MECKLEN-

HAM

LAND

FORD

SYTH

BURG

WAKE

Jurors Called
Jurors Served

-50%
-42%

-37%
-62%

-45%
-32%

-27%
-38%

-47%
-57%

-13%
-7%

Females Called
Females Served

-59%
-49%

-64%
-69%

-79%
-75%

-58%
-59%

-70%
-71%

-55%
-61%

Yrs.

12517

11934

9806

11706

16700

13590

Blacks
18+ Yrs.

5945

7629

8767

10180

14653

10374

Percent Black
48%
% of Total County

64%

89%

87%

88%

76%

32%

26%

35%

30%

34%

4

6

All persons

18+

Adult Blacks

Tracts

22%

5

7

10

7

The final question this project sought to study was which sources or
mix of sources of juror names might yield a representative community
cross section. All six counties used only the two sources required by law,
the voters and county tax lists; no other sources were included. From the
jury commissions reports it was possible to determine for all but Cumberland what proportion of names came from each list. The ratio of
voter to tax names for the five are: Durham 9-91 voter to tax; Guilford
48-52; Forsyth 89-11; Mecklenburg 94-6; Wake 99-1.
The answer to the question seems to be that neither of the two sources
by themselves used randomly, no matter what proportions are taken,
will yield a good cross section. Durham and Wake, two adjacent counties, took diametric approaches to the question of the best source.
Durham used 91 percent tax names while Wake took 99 percent from
the voter list. The study indicates that both have high rates of underrepresentation of blacks, the poor, and women-although the Durham
levels appear to be somewhat higher on jurors called and jurors served.
Table 2 seems to hint that, at least in a relative sense, the voter lists
may be better than the tax lists. After Wake, Forsyth and Mecklenburg
relied most heavily on the voter lists, using 89 and 84 percent respectively, while Guilford took roughly an even number from each. For the
predominantly black groups, the three counties taking names mainly
from the voter lists showed lesser rates of underrepresentation of persons
called and persons served than the two counties, Durham and Guilford,
using substantial numbers of tax names. However, further analysis
would be needed before any confident judgment can be made on the
relative merits of the two lists.
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CONCLUSION

This article is not meant to be definitive but rather is in the nature of
a preliminary exploration. It is fairly apparent that the average jury in
North Carolina does find women, blacks, young people and the poor
underrepresented. Since it is apparent that these groups have significantly different attitudes from white, middle-class, middle-aged males, the
differences mean that the average criminal defendant is not getting a
hearing before a cross-section of the community.
It is not the purpose of this article to establish what is probably
apparent to most defense lawyers, that middle income white males are
not the most favorable jurors for the average defendant. The intention
here is simply to establish that a cross-section of potential jurors should
be called as jurors and that is not being accomplished presently. The
right to a jury whioh is representative of the demographic characterisitics
of the community is a constitutionally protected right.
In order to achieve such a cross-section, a number of steps might be
taken either by legislative or administrative action. First, the jury commissioners should be informed that they are under an affirmative duty to
devise methods which will result in proportionate representation of
identifiable groups. Second, methods should be utilized to obtain and
maintain adequate records by race, sex, age and occupation of those
jurors who are actually called and who eventually serve. Third, the
present data would indicate that counties should rely more heavily on
the voter lists and less heavily on tax lists. Fourth, in order to increase
the number of blacks, women and young people, additional lists should
be used including school lists, welfare roles, telephone directories and
census information. Fifth, the results should be monitored so that the
necessary adjustments can be made after each two year period.
This problem could most suitably be addressed by the legislature.
Either in combination with legislative action or alone, the individual
counties can move administratively to improve the situation. If all else
fails, some remedial action may be encouraged by litigation.
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